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Abstract: In Bancoult, a majority of the House of Lords upheld the British Government’s use 
of the royal prerogative to expel the population of the Chagos Islands from their homeland.  
The majority acknowledged that the Government’s treatment of the Chagossians was 
disturbing, but held that the law left them with no choice but to hold the orders valid.  In this 
article, I draw a parallel between this decision and the eighteenth century judicial response to 
the Zong affair – where over a hundred slaves were thrown off a ship to drown in the sea.  
Both decisions are cloaked in formalist rhetoric but, as I show through an examination of the 
law as it stood prior to each of the decisions, the actual legal reasoning in both decisions is so 
without basis as to be unsustainable on any formalist or legalist account.  Rather, the decision 
in Bancoult, like the decision in the Zong, shows all the hallmarks of being a purely pragmatic 
one, prompted by broader concerns as to the practical impact of a contrary decision and the 
precedent it would set.  The inherent limitations of this mode of judicial reasoning make its 
deployment in Bancoult particularly troubling. 
Keywords: Constitutional law, royal prerogative, colonial law, legal history, judicial 
pragmatism 
1 Introduction: The Enslaved and the Colonised 
On 6 September 1781, a ship called the Zong set sail from the Guinea coast, carrying a cargo 
of 442 slaves for sale in the markets of Jamaica. By 27 November 1781, the ship was near her 
destination. What happened next is unclear. Instead of making land, they sailed on, passing 
Jamaica and continuing for nearly three hundred miles. The crew claimed to have mistaken 
Jamaica for Hispaniola, but not everyone believed this. What was not disputed, however, was 
that on 29 November, claiming that they were running out of water, the captain of the Zong 
ordered the crew to throw slaves overboard. Over a period of a little over a week, around 132 
slaves were thrown overboard to drown in the sea. The ship reached Jamaica on 22 December 
with its remaining slaves.1  
 The incident created an outcry in abolitionist circles in England, and it resulted in legal 
proceedings. But these were not criminal proceedings against the surviving crewmen, as the 
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abolitionists hoped. They were civil proceedings, brought in the Court of King’s Bench by the 
shipowners against their insurers to recover under their policy for loss of their cargo – the 
slaves – at sea.  
 To the shock of many who attended, the case was heard and argued as a simple 
insurance case.2 An initial trial found in favour of the shipowners.3 The insurers applied for a 
retrial.4 In the hearings for the retrial, counsel for the insurers argued that what had happened 
was a case of murder, for which the perpetrators should be tried at the Old Bailey.5 The 
judges of the King’s Bench, presided over by Lord Mansfield, however, gave little sign of 
treating the case as being anything but a simple case of insurance law. Their final decision 
was to order a retrial solely to determine the issue of whether the tossing overboard of the 
slaves was ‘necessary’, as the term was understood in insurance law.6  
 A little under two hundred years later, in August 1971, a ship sailed to the island of 
Diego Garcia, the largest island in the Chagos Archipelago, to expel the last of its inhabitants 
from their homes. The United Kingdom had in the 1960s agreed to lease Diego Garcia, a 
British colonial possession, to the United States who wished to establish a naval base in the 
Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia and its surrounding islands were, unfortunately, not empty as the 
US Government wished. The British government therefore proceeded to remove the 
inhabitants of the archipelago – called the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) – from their 
homes, initially by preventing their return from trips to Mauritius and – ultimately – 
compelling those who remained to leave.7 In 1971, an Immigration Ordinance made it illegal 
for any person – including the native islanders – to enter or remain in the BIOT.  
 Such an expulsion was contrary to resolutions of the United Nations. As documents in 
the National Archives demonstrate, the government of the day engaged in an elaborate 
scheme of lies and deception to hide its actions, involving the making of statements to 
Parliament and the United Nations that the government knew to be false.8 The expelled 
islanders, the ‘Chagossians’, to adopt their own demonym, were resettled in Mauritius and 
Seychelles where they lived in penury, having no livelihood and little means of finding one. A 
small amount of compensation was paid to them through the Mauritian government, but it 
was not sufficient to permit them to emerge from poverty.9  
 In 1998 Bancoult, one of the islanders, applied for judicial review of the Immigration 
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Ordinance. In 2000, the Divisional Court quashed the 1971 Ordinance.10 The Foreign 
Secretary – Robin Cook – indicated that the British Government would accept the ruling, and 
examine the feasibility of resettling the islands (with the exception of Diego Garcia).11 The 
Chagossians then filed a suit for compensation, which was dismissed as an abuse of process 
and on the ground of limitation.12  In 2004, however, citing the infeasibility of resettlement, 
the Government, under a new Foreign Secretary, issued two new Orders in Council13 whose 
effect was to restore full immigration control – in effect, putting the islanders back into their 
position under the Immigration Ordinance 1971. Bancoult once again applied for judicial 
review. The Divisional Court granted an order quashing the Orders in Council.14 This 
decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal,15 and the government appealed against that 
decision to the House of Lords.  
 In 2008, the House of Lords allowed the appeal (Lords Hoffmann, Rodger and Carswell 
in the majority, Lords Bingham and Mance dissenting), and dismissed the application for 
judicial review.16 Unlike inhabitants of the United Kingdom, their Lordships held, the 
inhabitants of a ceded colony were subject to the plenary legislative authority of the Crown.17 
Neither the Human Rights Act, nor the common law right of subjects of the Crown to enter 
and remain in the United Kingdom, prevented the Crown from taking away away the 
Chagossians’ right of abode, or any other right it chose, through an Order in Council without 
requiring the consent of Parliament.18 The Orders did not therefore violate any constitutional 
principle. In English law, the actions of the Government were perfectly legal and justified.  
 The two cases just discussed are strikingly similar at a number of levels. In both cases 
the perpetrators of the impugned acts denied that they owed duties to the victims as 
individuals. The shipowners in the Zong argued that the victims, as slaves, did not have a 
right to water or even life, as the other occupants of the ship did – they could, if their owners 
chose, be denied both.19 Similarly, the British Government in Bancoult argued that the 
Chagossians, as a colonised people, did not have a right to abode or to reside in their 
homeland, as Englishmen did. They could, if the British Government chose, be exiled 
permanently by executive fiat.20 Accepting these arguments essentially meant accepting an 
interpretation of the law which assigned an artificially created status to a group of persons, 
and defined the legal consequences of that status in a way that deprived them of fairly basic 
rights which most other persons enjoyed.  
 The courts in both cases clearly understood this, and understood the moral implications 
of condoning this state of affairs. Nonetheless, in both cases they chose to uphold the existing 
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order of things. They justified this by invoking formalism – the principle of ‘decision 
according to rule’, where the duty of a judge is to decide cases purely according to rules of 
law, unswayed by any other considerations no matter how compelling they may seem.21  And 
the law, they argued, left them with no choice but to uphold the existing order of things, 
however distasteful the result might seem to them.  ‘Though it shocks one very much’, Lord 
Mansfield said in the Zong, in law it made no difference whether the cargo thrown overboard 
was a cargo of slaves or horses.22 In Bancoult, too, the judges refer to the ‘callous 
disregard’,23 ‘brutal realities of global politics’,24 ‘unhappy – indeed, in many respects, 
disgraceful – events’,25 but ultimately say the law is clear. To quote Lord Carswell:  
For the reasons which I have given I would allow the appeal and make the order 
proposed by Lord Hoffmann. I do not do so through any lack of sympathy with 
the Chagossians. They were undoubtedly treated very shabbily when they were 
removed from the Islands. They were paid some compensation, but very tardily, 
while they suffered considerable privations after their removal. No one could fail 
to feel distressed about their plight at that time. It is the function of the courts, 
however, to adjudicate upon legal rights, and no matter how sympathetic they may 
be to a party who has been badly treated in the past, they are required to apply the 
law in the present and apply it properly and impartially – in the words of the Book 
of Common Prayer, truly and indifferently minister justice. It is that imperative 
which has taken me to the conclusion which I have reached.26 
 The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that this rhetoric of faithful, formalist, 
adherence to the law is profoundly deceptive.  In reality, existing authority did not constrain 
the courts to decide as they did.  To the contrary, as I show in this article (section 2), what 
authority there existed on the point at issue in both cases should have led the courts to the 
opposite conclusion from the one they actually reached.  And, indeed, in both cases the 
manner in which the courts applied the rules they claimed to be applying is so fundamentally 
and obviously flawed that the decisions are hard to explain on any formalist account.  The 
consequence, I argue (section 3) is that the decisions in both cases can only be understood if 
we look beyond the formalist language in which the courts clothed them, and instead view 
them as pragmatic responses to the fundamental legal questions raised by the cases before 
them.27  Rather than the reluctant fidelity to principles derived from precedent that the 
language of the decisions suggests them to be, the cases represented a more outcome-focused 
type of judicial decision-making, specifically, one where the judges were consciously or 
unconsciously influenced in their decision by the impact they believed the opposite 
                                                 
21 The term ‘formalism’, as a descriptor for an approach to answering legal questions, was first coined by 
the American realists as a term of opprobrium, and it continues to be used in that sense – ‘blind’ 
formalism – by a section of modern writers.  As I use the term in this article – which I define more fully 
in section 2 – it is not intended to have those negative connotations.. 
22 Sharp Transcript (n 4) 2-3 
23 Bancoult (HL) (n 16) [10] 
24 ibid [15]-[16] 
25 ibid [75] 
26 ibid [136] 
27  As I discuss in more detail in Section 3, the term ‘pragmatism’ typically refers to a type of judicial 
decision-making that is far more far more outcome-focused than formalism, where judges in deciding 
cases are influenced by their views as to the desirability or undesirability of the specific consequences 
that would flow from a decision either way (although pragmatists, like formalists, accept that the range of 
consequences that can legitimately be taken into account is not unbounded). 
 5 
conclusion would have had on related areas of law.  The hindsight of two centuries gives us a 
much better ability to understand the factors that weighed upon Lord Mansfield in the Zong 
and that led him to decide the case as he did, than we have in relation to Bancoult. But the 
parallels between the cases run deep, and analysing them side by side sheds much light on the 
specific factors that influenced the majority of the House of Lords to come to the conclusion 
they did.  
 Yet there is more to the decision in the Zong than meets the eye.  As I show in the final 
section of this paper (section 4), Lord Mansfield attempted to mitigate the impact of the legal 
position his judgment created in a way the majority in Bancoult did not.  The result, I argue is 
that the cavalier pragmatism that the majority chose to espouse represents a particularly 
troubling form of pragmatism – one that is unmitigated by any attempt to achieve pragmatic 
justice.  
2 Legal Formalism and Legal Error 
The essence of formalism as an actual mode of legal reasoning is, as contemporary theorists 
have shown, that it is focused on legal rules and, in particular, with the language in which 
legal rules are framed and the rationality that is immanent in them.  These are seen as 
directing the attention of the decision-maker to a selected set of factors, whilst simultaneously 
screening him off from other factors which ‘a sensitive decision-maker would otherwise take 
into account.’28   
 The speeches of Lord Mansfield in the Zong and the majority in Bancoult clearly 
suggest that this is the form of reasoning they were following.  But this claim to formalist 
reasoning is problematic for a variety of reasons.  In formalist terms, both the Zong and 
Bancoult were, literally, unprecedented – there were no cases that were even remotely 
analogous on their facts. In the Zong, counsel appearing for the insurers responded to Lord 
Mansfield’s statement that the case of slaves throw overboard was ‘just like horses’ by 
challenging the shipowners to produce a single precedent where money had been paid for loss 
of slaves under an insurance policy – the only such cases, they argued, were where ships had 
been lost or captured in enemy action.29 Counsel for the shipowners did not respond.  This 
lack of compulsion by precedent was also true of Bancoult. As other writers have pointed out, 
never before had any British government claimed so high a power of dominion over a 
colonised people, nor was there any authority to say that such a power existed.30  
 But the lack of precedent is not the main reason the supposed formalism in these cases 
is problematic.  The key argument I make in this section is that in relation to both cases, their 
reading of the relevant legal rules, and the meaning they assigned the terms in which those 
rules were framed departed so radically from that contained in established authority that it is 
hard to explain the decisions in formalist terms. 
                                                 
28
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A The Law of Slavery in the Zong 
The ultimate basis of the shipowners’ argument in the Zong was that slaves were chattel, and 
that the case should therefore be treated as one of goods. There was no question of murder or 
any other offence having been committed. The case was succinctly put in argument by John 
Lee, then solicitor general, appearing for the shipowners:  
Your Lordship will observe this is a case of chattels or goods. It is really so, it is 
the case of throwing over goods for to this purpose and the purpose of the 
insurance they are goods and property, and whether right or wrong we have 
nothing to do with it... If any man of them was allowed to be tried at the Old 
Bailey for a Murther... if that charge of Murther was attempted to be sustained... it 
would be folly and rashness to a degree of madness. There is not the least 
imputation of... impropriety, not in the least...31 
 As such, what had happened in this case was no different from a case of goods being 
thrown overboard under necessity to preserve the ship, and the policyholders were clearly 
entitled to recover in accordance with ordinary principles of insurance law, and applying the 
same ordinary test of necessity that was applicable to jettisoning any goods:  
When a person insures slaves as property which he assumes they are [and] they 
are thrown overboard from necessity as any other irrational Cargo or inanimate 
Cargo might be, whether he is entitled to recover the Value, there seems to be no 
doubt about it.32 
 In law, he emphasised, slaves were goods, and arguments that they should not be treated 
as goods amounted to arguments that the law was bad. This, he said, was not a question for 
the courts.  
All the arguments come to this: all our Law is foolish, arbitrary and tyrannical 
which makes Human Creatures the subject of Property. What has your Lordship 
to do with it? Nothing.33 
 The records of the hearing and the decision indicate that Lord Mansfield did not 
disagree with this summary of law: it was commercial practice in insurance contracts, he 
observed more than once, to treat slaves exactly like horses.34 His final decision was to remit 
the case to a fresh trial to determine whether on the facts of the case the shortage of water 
actually made throwing the slaves overboard necessary, and if the captain’s negligence 
affected the insurer’s liability in terms of the causation of the loss.35 In other words, he treated 
this as being in legal terms an ordinary case for the recovery on an insurance policy for the 
loss of goods at sea, as the Solicitor-General urged him to do.36  
 Yet there was a basic problem with this argument. On a purely formalist reading of the 
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law, the Zong was not a simple insurance case, the legal position of slaves being transported 
by ship was not the same as horses, and slaves could not be thrown overboard from necessity 
‘as any other irrational Cargo or inanimate Cargo.’ Rather, Lord Mansfield’s decision to 
decide the case as if it was so was a deliberate choice, and one which ran counter to basic 
principles of the common law as it was then understood by many jurists, including Lord 
Mansfield himself in Somerset’s case,37, where he had held that in English law slaves were 
not chattel or goods.  
 Somerset was a slave who had been brought back to England from the American 
colonies by his master. He escaped in 1771, but was recaptured, and his furious master put 
him on board a ship bound for Jamaica, intending to punish him by selling him into the life of 
a plantation slave. At the instigation of Granville Sharp, his godparents brought a writ for 
habeas corpus before the Court of King’s Bench.38 Lord Mansfield allowed the writ and held 
Somerset’s detention to be illegal.  
 Lord Mansfield’s rhetoric in that decision was high – so high that it was long thought to 
have outlawed slavery – but his actual holding in law was narrow.39 There were, prior to 
Somerset’s case, broadly speaking two schools of juristic opinion on the question of the status 
of slaves in England.  The first, represented by early 18th century cases such as Smith v 
Gould,40 held that slaves were not chattel in English law - slavery, rather, placed the slave in a 
status similar to villeinage.  Smith v Gould was an action in trover to recover a slave, which 
was denied by the Court of King’s Bench on the basis that trover lay for chattels, but men 
could not be the subject of property and as such the power of their masters over them was far 
more limited than in the case of chattel.41 The second opinion, associated specifically with 
Lord Hardwicke, held that slaves were chattel, and that masters had all the powers over them 
associated with the holding of chattel.42   
 Both opinions thus recognised the validity of slavery as an institution, but differed 
substantially on the question of the power a master had over his slave.  Somerset’s case 
brought the difference between these views sharply into focus.  If Lord Mansfield were to 
have upheld the latter view, Somerset’s master could have sent Somerset wherever he pleased 
and the writ would have had to be denied.  By granting the writ and holding the detention to 
be illegal, he upheld the former view of slavery, and rejected the suggestion that slaves were 
chattel.   
 In essence, Lord Mansfield held that English law did not recognise chattel slavery and 
as a result would not, in the absence of positive law, recognise the master as having a power 
to force his slave to leave the country. He did not outlaw slavery itself;43 and in later cases he 
compared the status of a slave in England to that of a villein in gross under feudalism much as 
Smith v Gould had done.44 Nonetheless, the rule in Somerset’s case – and in particular Lord 
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Mansfield’s statement that the power Somerset’s master claimed would not be recognised in 
the absence of positive law – ought to have had profound implications for the Zong.  
 Lord Mansfield’s reference to positive law went to the heart of his theory of the 
common law and its relationship with statute. As Lieberman shows, Lord Mansfield 
consistently held the essence of the common law to be ‘reason’ and ‘principle’.45 A rule that 
was not sanctioned by reason could only be sustained by ‘positive law’ – that is to say, by 
statute – or by ‘immemorial usage’, which in Lord Mansfield’s view usually represented the 
continuance of a principle of positive law after the circumstance that induced its introduction 
had been lost.46 And slavery was authorised by none of these. ‘Slavery,’ Lord Mansfield held, 
‘is of such a nature as not to be introduced by inference from principles either natural or 
political.’47 It was ‘so odious that it must be construed strictly’, to the extent that English law 
would not recognise the power to compel a slave to leave England unless it was contained in 
positive law.48  
 Nor was Somerset’s case an isolated instance of the application of this principle. A few 
years before Somerset, Lord Mansfield brought very similar reasoning to bear in Evans v 
Harrison, also known as the Cause between the City of London and the Dissenters.49 
Dissenters were, by statute, barred from several offices, including that of sheriff of the City of 
London. The City of London developed a practice of electing Dissenters to the office of 
sheriff, and imposing a large fine on them for not taking up the office. Harrison was one such 
Dissenter, and he refused to pay. The case came before the House of Lords, where Lord 
Mansfield delivered a speech supporting a ruling against the practice of the City of London. 
Echoing the language he would use in Somerset, he declared that the common law of England 
was ‘only common reason or usage’50, and that ‘persecution for a sincere, though erroneous 
conscience, is not to be deduced from reason or the fitness of things; it can only stand upon 
positive law.’51  
 All this should have had very clear implications for the Zong. The core principle 
represented by Somerset’s case and Evans v Harrison was clearly applicable – that rules of 
common law must be sanctioned by immemorial usage or principles deducible from reason, 
that slavery was so ‘odious’ that it fit neither, and that as a result it must be authorised by 
positive law and construed strictly. In Somerset’s case, the power to compel a slave to leave 
England could not, as a result, be recognised unless authorised by positive law. If that applied 
to power to expel from a country, what of the power to put to death, by far a higher dominion, 
and one expressly rejected in Smith v Gould?52 Surely that, too, by necessary implication had 
                                                                                                                                                        
318-9 fn 65. 
45 David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined (Cambridge University Press, 1989) 124-128. 
46  ibid 
47 Lord Mansfield’s precise words are reported differently in different reports. Here, I have followed the 
manuscript report of Serjeant Hill which, for the reasons identified by Oldham, is likely to be the most 
accurate account of what Lord Mansfield actually said. Oldham, ‘New Light on Mansfield and Slavery’ 
(n 40) 55-9 
48 George Van Cleve, ‘Somerset’s Case and its antecedents in imperial perspective’ (2006) 24 Law and 
History Review 601 at 633-42. 
49 The text of Lord Mansfield’s speech is printed in Philip Furneaux, Letters to the Honourable Mr. Justice 
Blackstone concerning his Exposition of the Act of Toleration and Some Positions relative to Religious 
Liberty in his celebrated Commentaries on the Laws of England, 2nd edition (Robert Bell 1771) 149-167. 
50 ibid 152. 
51 ibid 145. 
52  2 Ld. Raym. 1274, 92 ER 338; 2 Salkend 666, 91 ER 567. 
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to be authorised by positive law?  If slaves were not chattel, as Somerset’s case had held they 
were not, and if the power of a master over his slave had to come from positive law and be 
construed strictly, then it is a necessary consequence that a slaveowner should not have been 
to claim over his slaves the power of life and death he had over his horses, unless positive law 
gave it to him. 
 Lord Mansfield’s failure to discuss these questions is made even more puzzling by the 
fact that they were actually raised in argument. Somerset’s case was not cited in arguments in 
the Zong, and given the manner in which precedent was used in the seventeenth century, this 
should not surprise us. Nonetheless, the principles we have just seen – that the master of a 
slave lacked the power to throw a slave overboard, and that the correct parallels to be drawn 
were not with horses, but with the way in which other humans were treated, including the 
sailors on the Zong – were raised time and again by counsel in the Zong. Heywood, appearing 
for the insurers, expressly raised the issue that the power to throw slaves overboard as if they 
were cargo contradicted natural principles, echoing Lord Mansfield’s words in Somerset and 
Harrison. Heywood did not deny that in certain cases throwing overboard some to save others 
might be justified in law. But the starting point could not be the level of necessity necessary to 
justify the tossing overboard of goods. The correct analogy was a case of ‘a ship that is 
wrecked where two get upon the same plank.’ Here, the ‘Laws of Humanity or Nature’ would 
say that if one of them ‘feels the Plank sinking and he is stronger than the other there is no 
man living but would think himself perfectly justified in throwing off the other.’53 But absent 
such a high level of necessity, throwing slaves overboard could never be justified. The acts 
done by the crew of the Zong meant that the ‘Honor of Humanity and mankind in general’ 
were at issue, and that he and his fellow counsel appeared as ‘Counsel for Millions of 
Mankind and the Cause of Humanity in general.’54  
 Pigot, also appearing for the insurers, similarly declared that the mariners ‘ought to be 
tried for Murther in another place,’55 and argued that the slaves had the right to a certain 
minimum standard of treatment - as human beings, he said, they were as entitled to a share of 
the water as the mariners:  
The life of one Man is like the life of another Man whatever the Complexion is, 
whatever this colour. If there was a scarcity he would be entitled to that which 
remains and to a fair Chance for his life... I do contend before your Lordship that 
to their share of that Thimble full if it was no more those Men were as much 
entitled and have as good a Right as that Captain that did it or that Governor that 
advised it or any Man whatsoever.56 
 These arguments echoed those advanced – with success – in Somerset’s case. Nor were 
they out of tune with common sentiments at the time. The fate of the slaves became a rallying 
cause of the abolitionist movement,57 and members of the public who witnessed the trial were 
appalled by the result. Shortly after the conclusion of the first trial, an anonymous letter, 
apparently written by an individual who had attended the trial, appeared in the Morning 
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Chronicle. After describing the trial, the author of the letter continued:  
I waited with some impatience, expecting that the Jury, by their foreman, would 
have applied to the Court for information how to bring the perpetrator of such a 
horrid deed to justice... It is hardly possible for a state to thrive, where the 
perpetrator of such complicated guilt, as the present, is not only suffered to go 
unpunished, but is allowed to glory in the infamy, and carries off the reward of 
it.58 
 This, indeed, was the necessary implication of the principle that formed the basis of the 
ruling in Somerset’s case. It could no longer be unquestioningly accepted in any case that 
slaves were chattel, or that the master had untrammelled power over the slave. The common 
law did not automatically treat slaves as being chattel, but as human beings possessed of 
rights that were, as Hulsebosch puts it, ‘not qualified by race, birthplace or subjectship.’59 
Their status made them subject to the powers of their master, but these powers were to be 
strictly construed and must come from positive law. In every case, there must therefore 
necessarily be an enquiry into the question of whether the act of dominion was sanctioned by 
positive law in the place where it was sought to be exercised. And, given that in this case 
positive law did not permit masters to treat their slaves like cargo, or ‘just like horses’, the 
result should have been clear. But to these arguments, Lord Mansfield made no reply and he 
made no such enquiry.  
 On the face of it, Mansfield’s intransigence calls for an explanation. Why did he avoid 
being drawn into these broader issues? Why did he persist in defining the issues in the case 
narrowly, in dealing with the case under normal principles of insurance law, as if it were the 
same as with horses, when it was manifestly not so under English law? Why did he depart 
from the principles as to common law, reason and positive law that he had so consistently 
applied up until the Zong? I return to this question in the next section. For now, I turn to the 
parallels with the decision in Bancoult, which, as I show, is as difficult to explain in formalist 
terms as the Zong.  
B Colonial Law and the Constitution in Bancoult 
The Chagossians offered two sets of reasons why the Orders-in-Council exiling them were 
invalid.  Of these, the one that has attracted most academic attention in the literature on 
Bancoult, and the one which at least some of the majority in the House of Lords seem to have 
regarded as being the ‘main point’ at issue,60 was the challenge they brought on standard 
public law principles – specifically, their argument that the Orders were irrational and an 
abuse of power, and that they breached the legitimate expectations created by the 
Government’s statement in 2000 that it would accept the ruling of the Divisional Court. 61   
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 But there was another, and constitutionally far more significant, ground on which the 
Chagossians challenged the Orders-in-Council.  The Chagos Islands were acquired by Britain 
from France through conquest. Unlike colonies that had been settled by emigrants from 
England, colonies that had been acquired through conquest or cession were ruled entirely 
through the royal prerogative - laws made for them were seldom taken through Parliament 
and the arrangements for their governance were not usually formulated or ratified by 
Parliament. There were exceptions - the grant of independence, for example, usually took the 
form of an act of Parliament because the sovereign was not thought to have prerogative 
powers to give up territory - but these were few. Accordingly, the decisions to exile the 
Chagossians had all been made purely by executive fiat, without Parliamentary consent, as 
had the constitution of the BIOT and the arrangements for its government.  
 The Chagossians challenged the ability of the executive to so act without Parliamentary 
consent.  The power of the Executive to legislate for colonies by prerogative, they argued, 
though vast was not unlimited.  There were certain laws that, of their nature, lay beyond the 
scope of what the executive could do by prerogative: they could only be made by Parliament, 
and a law exiling a population from its homeland was one of these.62  Unlike the challenge on 
standard public law principles, this ground of challenge was not novel: it was based upon an 
ancient and well-established jurisdiction.  The courts of England had, since at least the time of 
Lord Coke, asserted the jurisdiction to determine the precise extent of the Crown’s 
prerogative and, thus, to review an exercise of the prerogative to determine whether the power 
in question actually existed,63 both in relation to England and the colonies.  
 As in the Zong, however, there were no direct precedents on the point of whether the 
prerogative power of the Crown was broad enough to permit it to dispossess an entire 
population of its homeland, without seeking or obtaining the consent of Parliament.  Never 
before in recorded history, not even in the darkest moments of colonial rule, had a British 
government sought to exile a population from its native land, or claimed that it had the power 
to do so. The question, therefore, had to be answered with reference to general constitutional 
principles. The main authority was Campbell v Hall,64 an 18th century decision of 
(coincidentally) Lord Mansfield. This case had held that in relation to conquered or ceded 
colonies, and such colonies alone, the Crown could exercise plenary legislative power by 
royal prerogative, but even so, the prerogative did not extend to letting the Crown make laws 
which were contrary to fundamental principles.65 The question in Bancoult was whether the 
order expelling the Chagossians fell afoul of this limitation on its prerogative powers.  
                                                                                                                                                        
the margins: Law, power, and prerogative’ (2010) 60 University of Toronto LJ 81.  The argument that the 
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existence and extent of the power, but not on ordinary principles of judicial review – in other words, 
whilst courts could determine whether a prerogative power existed, they could not review the manner of 
its exercise.  Although the House of Lords in In re the Council of the Civil Service Unions [1985] AC 374 
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62  See the reporter’s summary at [2009] 1 AC 453, 466-470 
63
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Poole, ‘The royal prerogative’ (n 61). 
64 1 Cowp. 204, 98 ER 1045; Lofft 655, 98 ER 848 
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 Sedley LJ in the Court of Appeal had answered this question in the affirmative,66 as did 
Lords Bingham67 and Mance68 in their dissents, each holding that clear authority negated the 
existence of so broad and so grave a prerogative power.  The answer of the majority of the 
House of Lords, however, was that it did not. There were two different – and mutually 
incompatible – lines of reasoning that supported the majority decision. The first is contained 
in the decisions of Lords Rodger and Carswell, and the second in the decision of Lord 
Hoffmann.  
 The decision of Lords Rodger and Carswell was based on an application of doctrines of 
colonial law. Lord Rodger held that, prima facie, there did indeed appear to be a fundamental 
principle of common law recognizing the right to abode.69 However, he held (and Lord 
Carswell agreed), the rule in Campbell v Hall had in effect been abolished by the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act 1865. Section III of this Act provided that no laws passed by a colonial 
legislature, or by the Crown in Council where a colonial legislature existed, would be ‘void or 
inoperative’ on the ground of ‘repugnancy to the law of England’, unless they were repugnant 
to the provisions an Act of Parliament that ‘by express words or necessary intendment’ was 
applicable to the colony in question, or to orders or regulations made under such an act. This, 
their Lordships held, meant that an Order in Council could no longer be reviewed on the 
ground that it violated fundamental principles of common law.70 Lord Hoffmann, in contrast, 
held that the Colonial Laws Validity Act did not apply to review by an English court, but then 
went on to hold that the action failed because there was no fundamental principle of law 
regarding the right to abode.71 As I show in this section, each of these arguments represents a 
striking departure from the law as it stood prior to Bancoult.  
 I start with the decision of Lords Rodger and Carswell. Setting aside the normative 
question of whether a contemporary case should be decided with reference to 18th century 
principles of governance, the argument of Lords Rodger and Carswell was profoundly flawed 
even on the 18th century principles it claimed to apply, because the specific issue with which 
the Colonial Laws Validity Act dealt – ‘repugnancy to the laws of England’72 – had nothing 
whatsoever to do with the doctrine of fundamental principles set out in Campbell v Hall 
because it dealt with a fundamentally different relationship. And, as in the Zong this ought to 
have been obvious to the Court because, with the exception of one comment in a Privy 
Council decision made in a very different context, every other source relied upon by their 
Lordships as being ostensibly in support of their decision made it unambiguously clear that 
Campbell v Hall and the Colonial Laws Validity Act were not connected, and that the Act did 
not apply to powers of the type exercised in Bancoult. This point was, for example, very 
clearly made in the key authority relied upon by Lords Rodger and Carswell for their analysis 
of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, a treatise by Swinfen, which states unambiguously that the 
ground of repugnancy with which the Act dealt only applied when Campbell v Hall did not.73 
To understand this point, and to see just how flawed the reasoning of Lords Rodger and 
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Carswell was, it is necessary briefly to discuss the ground of ‘repugnancy to the law of 
England’ which the Colonial Laws Validity Act restricts.  
(i) Repugnancy in colonial law    
The ground of repugnancy arose out of the idea that Parliament at Westminster, as an Imperial 
Parliament, had ultimate sovereignty over the colonies. Any persons or bodies given the 
power to make laws for the colonies were subject to Parliament’s overriding sovereignty. 
They were Parliament’s inferiors, and could not therefore make laws that were repugnant to 
those made by Parliament. If they did, such laws were void.74  
 The records of the Colonial Office, whose Law Officers were charged with the duty of 
scrutinising colonial legislation prior to the grant of Royal Assent, show that the scope of this 
doctrine - and its very existence - had always been controversial. In the course of an exchange 
in 1858, Sir Herman Merivale pointed out that neither its existence nor its scope had ever 
been confirmed by any court in Britain. It was, he said, entirely a creation of lawyers.75 And 
to many lawyers, the existence of the principle did indeed seem both obvious and a necessary 
consequence of the British constitution. As constitutional lawyers of the 18th and 19th 
centuries understood it, where the Crown had agreed to create a legislature in a colony, the 
Crown-in-colonial-legislature exercised a kind of sovereign authority in that territory, akin to 
the authority of the Crown-in-Parliament in relation to England, but subject to the overall 
sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament. The colonial legislature could not make laws that 
were repugnant to laws made by Parliament for that colony, because it was subordinate to 
Parliament.76 This frequently found expression in instruments or charters creating colonial 
legislatures, which restrained them from making laws repugnant to the laws of England. 
Lawyers took such provisions to be expressions of a broader constitutional principle, and not 
just specific statutory restrictions.77  
 This much was uncontroversial. But the question did not end there. It was also a 
constitutional principle that, subject to some qualifications, English settlers carried with them 
the common law of England as part of their birthright as Englishmen. Did the principle of 
repugnancy apply to these laws, what may be called the ‘general law of England’? After all, 
it, too, either had been made by Parliament (in the case of statutes) or had the tacit approval of 
Parliament (in the case of the common law). Did the colonial legislative authorities – the 
King-in-colonial-legislature and the King-in-council exercising the power of the local 
sovereign – have the power to make laws that were repugnant to those laws which were not 
made specifically by Parliament for that colony, but carried there by English settlers? It was 
evident – and never really disputed – that a colonial legislature had some authority to amend 
some of these laws, but the question was how far its authority went. This was the question 
that was at the heart of the controversy over the doctrine of repugnancy, and with which the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act dealt.  
 The Colonial Office had long taken a relatively narrow view of the ground of 
repugnancy. Sir James Stephen, during his time as Law Officer at the Colonial Office, raised 
the ground of repugnancy on more than one occasion, but does not appear to have ever 
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rejected a colonial law solely on that ground. He eventually came around to the view, which 
he expressed in the course of reviewing a law made in relation to Van Dieman’s Land, that 
the phrase ‘repugnant to the law of England’ only referred to Acts of Parliament made for that 
colony.78  
 A more significant discussion of the ground of repugnancy took place in the Colonial 
Office in 1858, in the course of considering whether Royal assent should be granted to the 
South Australia Marriage Act, which sought to allow widowers to marry their deceased wife’s 
sister. Sir Frederic Rogers in his report on the law argued that it was repugnant to 
fundamental principles of English law and as such probably void, but agreed that this was a 
controversial ground and that it was better dealt with by withholding Royal assent.79 More 
senior administrators had an even less favourable view of the ground of repugnancy. 
Merivale’s notes to Sir Frederic’s report, cited above, suggest that he disagreed strongly. The 
repugnancy doctrine, he said, was a creation of lawyers’ minds. No court had ever held that 
the ground of repugnancy extended to preventing legislation contrary to uncodified 
fundamental principles of English law, and such purported repugnancy should not be a ground 
on which assent was refused.80  
 The response of Lord Stanley, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the views 
of Rogers and Merivale explains why the Colonial Office took such a narrow view. He was, 
he said, of the view that the Act should be assented to, on the ‘general ground of colonial 
independence’ and ‘colonial freedom to legislate on such matters independently of 
England.’81 And in practice, this view was the dominant one in the Colonial Office. Whilst the 
notion of repugnancy did come up from time to time in discussions of individual laws, there 
are no examples of a formal declaration that a colonial law was void. Whatever views officers 
such as Sir Frederic Rogers may have held on the validity of colonial laws repugnant to 
general principles of English law, in nearly every case where they raised the ground of 
repugnancy, it was merely cited as one ground amongst others to support a recommendation 
to disallow a law by withholding the Royal Assent.82  
 In contrast, colonial courts, and as far as the record reveals, only colonial courts, 
sometimes took the broader view that Merivale says lawyers favoured. In the 1860s, this was 
perceived as having gotten out of hand, and the Colonial Laws Validity Act was passed to 
give statutory force to the view that had long prevailed in the practice of the Colonial 
Office.83 This was the rule Lords Rodger and Carswell claimed to apply to counter the 
argument that the Orders in Council violated fundamental principles of common law. Yet, as I 
will show in the next section, in point of fact, none of this had anything to do with the rule in 
Campbell v Hall, which was concerned with an entirely different relationship.  
(ii) ‘Contrary to fundamental principles’  
Campbell v Hall - despite being well known to constitutional lawyers - is not as much as 
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mentioned in any of the discussions in the Colonial Office concerning repugnancy. Merivale 
was quite unambiguous in stating that no British court had ever recognised the ground of 
repugnancy to uncodified general principles of English law. 84 This is because Campbell v 
Hall was not concerned with the superiority of Imperial legislative authorities over colonial 
legislative authorities, or with the principle of repugnancy. As even a perfunctory reading of 
the case makes clear, it dealt with a far more fundamental constitutional issue, namely, the 
separation of powers between Crown and Parliament and the ultimate supremacy of 
Parliament in every aspect of the relationship between Crown and Parliament, including in 
relation to the Empire. Campbell v Hall, in other words, was concerned with the basic issue of 
the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament over the Imperial Monarch under the British 
Constitution.  
 The context for Campbell v Hall was this. It had long been the law in England that 
although Englishmen carried common law – to the extent applicable – with them in settling a 
new colony, English law did not automatically apply to a ceded or conquered colony. In 
relation to the latter, the Crown had plenary power to legislate, and until the crown exercised 
this power the old laws continued.85 The question upon which Lord Mansfield pronounced in 
Campbell v Hall was how far this power extended. To what extent could the Crown legislate 
for a conquered territory without requiring the authority of Parliament?  
 In the reign of James I, the courts had given one answer. The case was Calvin’s Case86 
and the judge was Lord Coke. In relation to a conquered colony, he said, the King had the 
powers of an absolute monarch, and he could make whatever laws he chose by mere exercise 
of the Royal Prerogative. He was not restricted from legislating by prerogative in any way.  
 This decision must be understood in the context of the constitutional questions that 
arose in the time of the first Stuart kings.87 James I claimed the right to rule as an absolute 
monarch, leading to many conflicts both with Parliament and the judiciary - notably with 
Coke himself in the Prohibitions del Roy.88 Coke’s decision in Calvin’s Case reflects the 17th 
century English understanding of why the King of England was not, and could not be, an 
absolute monarch ruling by divine right. Kings might have this power elsewhere, and it might 
even be the default power which kings had, but it was not the law of England.89 Colonies 
governed by the law of England, therefore, could not countenance an absolute monarch, but 
others could and would.  
 Lord Mansfield’s decision in Campbell v Hall has to be read and understood as a 
reaction to this position. He rejected Lord Coke’s ruling that the Crown had the powers of an 
absolute monarch in relation to conquered and ceded colonies, and gave an answer that was 
even more restrictive of the Crown’s powers. While the King did have a plenary power to 
legislate for conquered or ceded colonies, Lord Mansfield held, he could not by prerogative 
make legislation that was contrary to fundamental principles.90 The King (or Queen) of 
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England, though he may be monarch of the Empire, was himself when acting in council (i.e., 
without the consent of Parliament) exercising an authority subordinate to that of the King in 
Parliament, and as such could not have more than a limited power to legislate without the 
consent of Parliament. Parliament, and only Parliament, had the power to transcend or alter 
fundamental principles.91  
 The constitutional basis, and practical effect, of the doctrine of fundamental principles 
was fundamentally different from the ground of repugnancy. No conflict with an Act of 
Parliament was needed here, nor was a subordinate colonial legislature involved. Lord 
Mansfield, as is well known, was a committed Whig of the old corps,92 and Campbell v Hall 
embodies that Whiggish understanding of the Constitution.93 Since ultimate sovereignty 
vested with Parliament, it was only Parliament - and not the Crown - that had unlimited 
legislative power. The Crown, even in his capacity as monarch of a conquered colony, was 
subject to Parliamentary authority and as such did not have the power to make legislation 
contrary to fundamental principles, unless he had specifically been given the authority to do 
so. Lord Mansfield’s judgment leaves little doubt about the constitutional principle on which 
his decision is based:  
[I]f the King has power (and when I say the King, I mean in this case to be 
understood “without concurrence of Parliament”) to make new laws for a 
conquered country, this being a power subordinate to his own authority, as a part 
of the supreme Legislature in Parliament, he can make none which are contrary to 
fundamental principles94 
 This restriction – and the power of courts to review laws that were made in violation of 
it – was not dealt with by the Colonial Laws Validity Act. The only ground of nullity of 
colonial legislation discussed in the Colonial Laws Validity Act was the ground of 
repugnancy. In consequence, the only relationship with which it was concerned was the one 
between the empire and the colonies. It made no reference to, was not concerned with, and 
was not intended to affect, the relationship between crown and Parliament. As a result, the 
only prerogative power with which it dealt was the prerogative power which the king had 
under the local constitution of a colony to legislate without the consent of the colonial 
legislature – for example, powers granted under a colony’s charter. Campbell v Hall in 
contrast dealt with the prerogative power of the Crown under the British constitution itself – 
the power to legislate for a conquered country by prerogative without being subject to the 
legislative power of Parliament. The contrast between these two types of prerogative was a 
well established one in colonial constitutional law. In Abeyesekera v Jayatilake95 the Privy 
Council (in relation to Ceylon, also a ceded colony) described the difference as being between 
‘an exercise of the royal prerogative by the King in Council, as the supreme executive officer 
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of the Island’ and ‘the exercise by His Majesty, as Sovereign, of the legislative powers 
inherent in him by his title derived from conquest and cession of Ceylon, so far as he had not 
parted with any of them by acts of his own.’96  
 This distinction, established in constitutional law for over two hundred years, was 
correctly summarised by the counsel for the Chagossians as being the difference between 
vires or limits on power on the one hand and repugnancy on the other.97 This was not a case 
of the making of a law which was within the ordinary legislative competence of a colonial 
legislature, but which was invalid because of a conflict with another law. The British 
government here purported to make a law which, under the British Constitution as it was 
understood up to that time, it did not have the power to make without Parliamentary consent: 
a law that, therefore, lay beyond its legislative competence. Yet this distinction was 
perfunctorily dismissed by the House of Lords in Bancoult – Lord Hoffmann rejecting it as 
being ‘too fine to be serviceable.’98 And, overruling centuries of settled jurisprudence in 
relation to the fact that Parliament alone has unlimited sovereignty, and that, in consequence, 
the prerogative of the Crown-in-Council, as a subordinate power, is necessarily subject to 
substantive bounds,99 Lords Rodger and Carswell held, in effect, that the Crown had 
unlimited power to legislate in relation to conquered colonies – that, in relation to these 
colonies, the British government of the day has the powers of an absolute monarch, and could 
rule as they pleased without needing to obtain the consent of Parliament and without 
responsibility to Parliament – or, indeed, any elected body. By doing so, they took the British 
constitution back to Calvin’s case and the reign of James I.100  
 One would expect that a decision this momentous would not be made unless it rested on 
the foundation of solid authority. But there was no such authority to support the decisions of 
Lords Rodger and Carswell. There was no binding authority in support of the proposition that 
the Colonial Laws Validity Act had overruled Campbell v Hall and removed all restrictions 
on the executive’s legislative power to legislate for colonies without the consent of 
Parliament. Liyanage,101 to which they referred, was a decision of the Privy Council, and its 
statements on Campbell v Hall did not speak to the specific point at issue in Bancoult which, 
as both Sedley LJ102 and Lord Mance103 pointed out, preceded the question of repugnancy.  
Even more fundamentally, the powers of the Ceylonese Parliament which were at issue in 
Liyanage had been conferred by Parliament under the Ceylon Independence Act, not an Order 
in Council. They were therefore not derived from the Royal Prerogative, and were not subject 
to the restrictions set out in Campbell v Hall.  
 Against this single throwaway comment stood every other authority cited in the 
decisions of Lords Rodger and Carswell. Yet their Lordships, against the express words of the 
very authorities they cited in support of their decision, chose to interpret the law in a way that 
conferred upon the executive an unprecedented amount of power at the expense of 
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Parliament. In much the same way as with Lord Mansfield in the Zong, they chose to accept 
as law an argument that is, legally, so difficult to sustain that the willingness of Lords 
Carswell and Rodger to accept it demands an explanation.  
(iii) The right of abode    
The decision of Lord Hoffmann, although based on a different ground, is no less problematic 
in law. In contrast to Lords Rodger and Carswell, Lord Hoffmann held that the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act did not apply to review by an English court. Nonetheless, he held that there was 
no fundamental principle of law regarding the right to abode. It was a creation of law which 
the law could take away, and it was not recognized by the laws of the Chagos Islands.  
What these citations show is that the right of abode is a creature of the law. The 
law gives it and the law may take it away. In this context I do not think that it 
assists the argument to call it a constitutional right. The constitution of BIOT 
denies the existence of such a right. I quite accept that the right of abode, the right 
not to be expelled from one’s country or even one’s home, is an important right. 
General or ambiguous words in legislation will not readily be construed as 
intended to remove such a right... But no such question arises in this case. The 
language of section 9 of the Constitution Order could hardly be clearer. The 
importance of the right to the individual is also something which must be taken 
into account by the Crown in exercising its legislative powers... But there seems 
to me no basis for saying that the right of abode is in its nature so fundamental 
that the legislative powers of the Crown simply cannot touch it.104 
 The reference to the constitution of BIOT upon which this argument turns was clearly 
wrong. A plain reading of Campbell v Hall makes it obvious that the restriction on the royal 
prerogative which Lord Mansfield set out in that case is a restriction imposed by the British 
constitution on the powers of the Crown as a conquering sovereign. It must therefore be 
judged with reference to those principles that are fundamental to the British constitution. 
What the law of the Chagos Islands may say is irrelevant. If the Crown could not by 
prerogative make a law denying the Chagossians’ right of abode, it could not by prerogative 
make a constitution for the colony which denied their right of abode.  
 And, judged by the standards of the British constitution, there is evidence to suggest 
that even in the eighteenth century, exiling an entire population was thought to be 
impermissible. Although Lord Mansfield did not elaborate in Campbell v Hall on what the 
‘fundamental principles’ that restricted the scope of the prerogative actually were, there were 
other cases where he considered the scope of the powers of the Crown, or of governors 
appointed by the Crown. Most telling are his observations in Mostyn v Fabrigas,105 decided a 
few years before Campbell v Hall. Fabrigas, a resident of Minorca, a conquered colony, had 
been imprisoned by the Governor of the island, the defendant Mostyn, for ten months and 
then compulsorily transported to Carthagena in the dominions of the King of Spain. On 
Mostyn’s return to Britain, Fabrigas brought an action against him for assault and false 
imprisonment. Mostyn contended that he governed Minorca ‘as all absolute Sovereigns do’, 
in response to which counsel for Fabrigas argued that he could have no such power, for the 
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King did not and hence could not delegate it to another.106 Lord Mansfield agreed. And on the 
specific facts of the case, he said that in times of war, he said, a governor might legitimately 
‘judge it proper to send an hundred of the inhabitants out of the island from motives of real 
and genuine expediency,’ but not in times of peace.  
 In tone and in the principle on which it was based, this ruling has a close parallel in 
Lord Mance’s dissent in Bancoult.107  But the contrast with the majority ruling in Bancoult is 
stark. Even in a time of war, when faced with real and genuine expediency, Lord Mansfield 
conceived of the power of the Crown – and its governors – as extending, perhaps, to the exile 
of a small proportion of the inhabitants of a conquered colony. As Lord Mance rightly pointed 
out, it is hard to imagine him, or the courts of his time, holding that the executive could by 
prerogative exile the entire population of a colony in peacetime, where no pressing 
expediency mandated it.108 Nor was this view confined to Lord Mansfield. The records of the 
proceedings before the King’s Bench in the Case of Thomas Picton109 suggest that other 
jurists may have been prepared to go even further. In proceedings arising out of the alleged 
torture of inhabitants of Trinidad by its governor, General Thomas Picton, it was strongly 
urged on behalf of the prosecution that torture could never be authorised by the Crown, for it 
was contrary to fundamental principles and hence would contravene Campbell v Hall, and 
that the doctrine of fundamental principles embraced the Magna Carta and all laws that fell 
within the class of ‘fundamental laws’ as discussed by Blackstone and Coke.110 No decision 
was ever issued in that case, but the argument gives a clear view of how broad legal 
conceptions of ‘fundamental principles’ could be.  
 Yet we find no trace of any discussion of this in Lord Hoffmann’s decision which – 
without any support in authority and contrary to established precedent – treats the question of 
fundamental principles as being one of the local constitution of the colony, rather than the 
imperial constitution, and does not even discuss what restrictions, if any the British 
constitution might place on the royal prerogative. And, much as was the case with Lord 
Mansfield in the Zong, Lord Hoffmann’s approach is characterised by its narrowness. The 
true question at issue was not whether or not the law could take away the right of the 
Chagossians to their abode – under the British constitution, any right can be taken away 
through Parliamentary action. The question was, rather, whether such a law could be made by 
royal prerogative, without the consent of Parliament. Lord Hoffmann’s reasoning blurs this 
distinction, suggesting that the Crown has whatever authority Parliament has, and is subject to 
no greater restriction than Parliament. In explaining the reasons for his decision, Lord 
Hoffmann quoted Blackstone’s statement that ‘no power on earth, except the authority of 
Parliament, can send any subject of England out of the land against his will,’ and continued:  
That remains the law of England today. At common law, any subject of the Crown 
has the right to enter and remain in the United Kingdom whenever and for as long 
as he pleases... The Crown cannot remove this right by an exercise of the 
prerogative. That is because since the 17th century the prerogative has not 
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empowered the Crown to change English common or statute law. In a ceded 
colony, however, the Crown has plenary legislative authority. It can make or 
unmake the law of the land.111 
 Implicit in this line of reasoning is an analogy between the Crown’s prerogative powers 
over conquered or ceded colonies and the powers of Parliament over England. But this 
analogy has no basis in authority, and is manifestly opposed to Campbell v Hall. If the powers 
of the Crown in relation to a ceded colony are as wide as those of Parliament in relation to 
England, then, contrary to the rule in Campbell v Hall, there is nothing that cannot be done by 
prerogative. Lord Hoffmann suggested that ordinary principles of judicial review – legality, 
rationality and procedural impropriety – were sufficient to enable courts to prevent the use of 
executive fiat to legitimate certain acts such as torture.112 The basis of this argument is 
unclear, but even if it is true, the category of executive acts that would of their nature 
necessarily be irrational or disproportionate is rather small, and certainly smaller than the 
restrictions imposed by Campbell v Hall. No less than the decisions of Lord Rodger and 
Carswell, this decision – without the support of authority – in effect eliminates the restrictions 
on the prerogative imposed by Campbell v Hall.  
 In both the Zong and Bancoult, therefore, the strong formalist rhetoric invoked by the 
courts – that the law was what it was and the courts had little choice but to apply it, however 
appalling the results – was at best misleading. The legal positions articulated by the courts in 
their judgments did not have the support of authority that the courts claimed. In terms of the 
authorities, the arguments they rejected were by far the stronger.  
 What explains this outcome? Why did the courts choose to uphold the denial of basic 
rights to a class of people – a denial with which they were clearly uncomfortable – on the 
basis of apparently formalist arguments that were so obviously weak and flawed? In the next 
section, I turn to this question, and argue that the decisions are best explained as an approach 
to interpreting the law which is heavily influenced by pragmatic considerations.  
3 Legal Consequences and Judicial Pragmatism 
At the core of pragmatism is a focus on what its proponents term ‘standards’ rather than 
‘rules’, and on consequences – specifically, on the consequences of the action complained of 
and the consequences of judicial intervention – rather than on moral or political theories.  
Pragmatic adjudication is, consequently, characterised by a marked preference for considering 
questions of remedies rather than focusing on theoretical questions concerning the underlying 
rights, and by a preference for narrow rulings rather than broad ones.113   
 It is the presence of all these factors in the decisions in the Zong and Bancoult that 
renders them far more intelligible when viewed as pragmatic decisions.  Both cases 
demonstrate a reluctance by the courts to deal with the question of the limits of the power that 
the defendants had over the victims – the power of the executive to rule by prerogative in 
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Bancoult and the power of slaveowners to treat slaves as they wished in the Zong – despite 
the importance of these issues to the cases and the clear evidence of numerous authorities that 
these limits really did exist.  In both cases, the reluctance was supported by a narrow 
definition of the issues, a narrow reading of the authorities and a narrowly expressed 
conclusion.   
 This reluctance is most clearly visible in the Zong where, as we have seen, Mansfield 
failed to take into account the implications of the ruling on the nature of slavery that he had 
himself made in Somerset’s case.  But the decisions of the majority in Bancoult are strikingly 
similar to Mansfield's decision in the Zong in their reluctance to engage with the details or the 
basis of the legal rules were at issue.  And, much like Mansfield's decision in the Zong, they 
are strongly influenced by the outcome their decision would produce – and, particularly, what 
they believed to be the true motives of the Chagossians in bringing the action. 
 Most strikingly, the majority’s marked preference for the ordinary grounds of judicial 
review is characteristic of the pragmatic preference for what its proponents call ‘standards’ – 
broad, loosely defined principles that give judges considerable latitude in relation to the 
factors they take into account – over more narrowly defined ‘rules’.114  Whilst a pragmatic 
approach to adjudication can, and not infrequently will, find pockets where a rule-based 
approach is useful,115 its general preference is for the scope to take a greater variety of facts 
into account that standards give.116  ‘Proportionality’, ‘legality’ and ‘reasonableness’ are 
canonically standards; whereas absolute limits on powers are rules.  A pragmatic court will 
almost inevitably favour the former at the expense of the latter.   
 But the speeches of the majority also display a number of other clear features of a 
pragmatic approach, particularly when contrasted with the speeches of the minority.  Consider 
again, for example, Lords Rodger and Carswell's dismissal of the principle in Campbell v 
Hall.  Both, in addition to holding that the principle had been abolished by the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act, questioned whether Lord Mansfield had any substantive principles at all in mind 
when stating that the King’s prerogative would not exceed to contravening ‘fundamental 
principles.’ All he had in mind, they said, was the dispensing power.117 Yet, as we have seen 
above, Lord Mansfield’s own decisions in cases such as Mostyn v Fabrigas118 (a case noted 
and cited in the speech of Lord Rodger119) make it very clear that he did have in mind wider 
substantive principles – so much so that, as Lord Mance rightly noted in his dissent,120 it is 
hard to imagine him finding that the prerogative power extended to the making of Orders-in-
Council such as those that were the subject of Bancoult.  Yet there is no engagement in the 
majority decisions with the considerable evidence as to the principled basis of Campbell v 
Hall or what the rule articulated by Lord Mansfield actually meant.  All we see is the 
impressionistic assertion – characteristic of pragmatism – that he could not possibly have 
meant what the Chagossians claimed he did. 
 A similar reluctance to engage with the principles underlying Campbell v Hall – and, 
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more generally, the theory that the power to legislate by prerogative is of necessity a limited 
one – is visible  in the decision of Lord Hoffmann.  Thus, as we have seen, he characterised 
the constitutional questions as ‘extreme arguments’, and said that it was the ‘application of 
ordinary principles of judicial review’ that was ‘the main point in this appeal’121 going on, 
ultimately, to simply assert, without citing any authority or constitutional principle, that the 
royal prerogative over a conquered colony extended to the making of any laws that Parliament 
was competent to make for the UK.122  
 The contrast with the dissenting judgments of Lords Bingham and Mance in the House 
of Lords could not be greater.  Far from being an ‘extreme’ argument to be perfunctorily 
dismissed, the issue of the scope of the prerogative was to them the more important one.123  In 
contrast to the majority, they did not simply draw impressionistic parallels between the power 
of the executive to legislate by prerogative in relation to conquered colonies and the power of 
Parliament to legislate in the domestic realm.  Instead, they explored the question of whether 
this analogy was supported by the authority of precedent and the constitutional principles 
which the precedents reflected.  And they found – as they were bound to – that it was not.  As 
Lord Mance pointed out, historically, the prerogative power to legislate for colonies had 
always been seen to be limited by principles that had no application to Parliamentary 
legislation.124  As both also recognised, there is a fundamental difference between the 
representative and deliberative nature of Parliamentary action, and the secretive nature of 
executive legislation by prerogative.125  This difference has long been constitutionally 
significant, and it remains so today.  Whilst Parliament can legislate as it may, the power of 
the prerogative is at best a historical anachronism, which cannot be said to exist unless 
evidence is produced that it has actually existed in the past. 126  No such evidence existed – 
indeed, what evidence existed suggested that it would not have been seen as being so 
extensive in the 18th century.  It was hardly possible, he thought, that given the nature of the 
British constitution, the latitude it gives to the executive to act without Parliamentary consent 
could have expanded since then. 127 
 What we see in the dissents128 is thus a meticuluous examination of the legal principles 
which justify the grant by the common law to one of power over another, and which must be 
shown to be satisfied when the existence of an unprecedented power is asserted.  This level of 
engagement with the meaning of the principles embedded in legal rules, and consideration of 
the historical and theoretical foundations of constitutional rules and of the authorities 
establishing them, is the very essence of principled, formalist reasoning; yet there is little if 
any trace of it in the majority decisions.  What we see instead is precisely the sort of 
superficial fact-based engagement with precedent and the overweening preoccupation with 
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remedies129 that is characteristic of pragmatism.   
 As we shall see in the next secion, Bancoult  is not an isolated example of the adoption 
of a pragmatic approach to the limits of the executive’s power: it is just one instance – albeit a 
particularly troubling one – of a broader, worrying trend which began manifesting itself in the 
final years of House of Lords.  As I argue, the basis of this trend, and the severe limitations it  
imposes on the process of adjudication, stand in sharp contrast to the much more nuanced role 
pragmatism played in Lord Mansfield’s decisions. Cumulatively, these show the decision of 
the majority in Bancoult in a far worse light than the Zong.  
4 The Source and Limits of Pragmatic Adjudication 
A Accounting for Pragmatism 
What, then, were the consequences that so troubled the courts, and that led them to decide 
these cases pragmatically, with so little attention to the underlying questions of principle?  It 
is relatively easy to rule out the most obvious explanations. Neither court was inherently 
inimical to formalism, as Mansfield’s decision in Somerset’s case and Lord Hoffmann’s 
speech in Simms demonstrate.130  Equally, Mansfield’s decision in the Zong was not the result 
of an essentialist worldview, or of any sort of ideological support for slavery. We know that 
Mansfield was not personally racist.131 We also know that he was not among the many vocal 
defenders of slavery who existed at that time. Unlike Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, who as an 
advocate vocally defended the institution of slavery and as a judge took every opportunity to 
judicially confirm the views he had earlier espoused,132 Mansfield’s description of slavery in 
Somerset – an institution ‘so odious that it must be construed strictly’ – was no mere 
rhetorical flourish, and is likely to have represented his true view of the common law position 
on the rights and liabilities of slaves.133  
 Equally, his decision was not a result of a deference to Parliament in terms of policy 
making. Mansfield’s views of Parliament as a giver of laws were mixed, and he did not 
always defer to the policies it sought to implement. On the contrary, he could be quite activist 
when it came to defending vulnerable minorities from oppression. The starkest examples of 
this are the actions he took to protect religious freedom, particularly for Catholics. The Penal 
Laws were in force at this time, and a band of professional informers made it their business to 
track down Catholics attending clandestine masses and collect a share of the fines that were 
charged. Mansfield put an end to this practice through an innovative interpretation of the 
                                                 
129  Lord Hoffmann, in particular, placed a great deal of emphasis on what he believed were the true motives 
of the Chagossians - an attempt to pressure the Government to fund settlement - and on the undesirability 
of the Courts giving assistance to such pressure: see Bancoult (HL) (n 16) [53]-[56], and especially his 
statement at [54] that ‘if one keeps firmly in mind the practical effect of section 9 of the Constitution 
Order, the issues in this appeal fall into place.’ and his repeated references to the necessarily symbolic 
effect of a ruling in favour of the Chagossians.  Lords Carswell and Rodger appear to have agreed to this 
analysis: see [110] (Lord Rodger) and [134] (Lord Carswell).  Contrast this with Lord Mance’s curt 
dismissal of this point as ‘not supported by any reference in the written case’ ibid [168] (Lord Mance) and 
Sedley LJ’s ruling in the Court of Appeal that to focus on this was to miss the point: the true point was 
‘that the two Orders in Council negate one of the most fundamental liberties known to human beings, the 
freedom to return to one’s homeland’ Bancoult (CA) (n 15) [71]. 
130  R  v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Simms, [2000] 2 AC 115. 
131 Jeremy Krilker, ‘The Zong and the Lord Chief Justice’ (2007) 64 History Workshop Journal 29 at 40-2. 
132 Cleve (n 48) 619-21. 
133 Oldham, ‘English Common Law in the Age of Mansfield’ (n 44) 305. 
 24 
statute that so increased the evidentiary burden as to make successful prosecutions virtually 
impossible - the prosecution now had to prove that the priest in question was ordained by the 
Church at Rome, and that the words being said were the actual Latin Rite and not merely 
words in Latin. 134 For this, he paid a heavy personal price – his house was razed by an irate 
mob during the Gordon Riots, and his entire library destroyed.135  
 Similarly, the decision in Bancoult cannot simply be treated as an instance of the courts 
deferring to the judgment of the executive on a matter of national security. The House of 
Lords did not uniformly defer to the executive’s – or even the legislature’s – judgment in 
matters of national security, as is amply demonstrated by cases such as those relating to the 
Belmarsh detainees136 or the use of secret evidence in proceedings for the issue of control 
orders.137 And, in any event, the extent to which Bancoult actually raised issues of national 
security is questionable. Lord Bingham in his dissent pointed out that there was no evidence 
at all to show that the Chagossians posed any threat,138 and the Court of Appeal noted that the 
defence of national security – a recognised defence in judicial review of the prerogative – had 
not been raised in the case.139  Additionally, there are already a substantial number of non-
Americans present on the base. Running the base requires at any time the presence of civilian 
workers who are, for the most part, flown in from the Philippines, Sri Lanka and other sources 
of cheap labour.140 No arguments were presented to show why a permanent population of 
Chagossians would pose any greater security hazard than these workers. In any event, 
resettlement was not at issue as the courts at each level were at pains to stress – even the 
Divisional Judge, despite being prepared to hold the Orders in Council to be invalid, was 
unwilling to so much as grant a hearing on the issue of ordering relief specifically related to 
resettlement.141  Finally, according to Vine, yachts sailing the Indian Ocean frequently land at 
the Outer Islands of the Chagos Archipelago without any action being taken to stop them.142 
The only individuals in relation to whom such action was deemed necessary are the 
Chagossians.  
 Rather, both decisions reflect a particular sort of judicial pragmatism, of a type to which 
– as Atiyah pointed out – the English legal process is particularly susceptible.143 Lord 
Mansfield’s stubborn refusal to countenance any attempt to broaden the dispute to include 
issues outside insurance law provides an important clue as to the factors that lay behind his 
approach in the Zong. A decision on the issues which the insurers sought to raise would have 
forced a decision on a much more basic question. If slaves were not chattel, but were human 
beings, how, then, should they be treated on transatlantic voyages? This was not a question on 
which Lord Mansfield was prepared to pronounce.  
 There were two reasons for Lord Mansfield’s reluctance to rule on this point. First, a 
decision that at common law slaves could not be treated as cargo would have had 
ramifications that went far beyond the narrow issue of insurance. In insurance terms, the 
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effect would have been relatively minor. A decision holding the policy void, whether on the 
ground of illegality or on the narrower ground that the owners lacked an insurable interest in 
the slaves because they were not the owners’ chattel, could have easily been circumvented by 
taking out life insurance policies on the lives of the slaves.144 But its effects elsewhere would 
have been far more potent. Unlike a statute, whose effect could be as narrow or broad as 
Parliament chose, a decision that on principle slaves could not be treated as cargo unless 
positive law authorised it would have affected not only the sort of insurance contracts that 
were at issue in the Zong, but the entire system of carriage of slaves across the Atlantic. It was 
beyond question that the entire transatlantic slave trade was based around treating slaves as if 
they were chattel. They were stored like cargo, treated like cargo and insured like cargo, and 
their treatment was reflected in the fact that mortality on slave ships was significantly higher 
than mortality on other transatlantic voyages.145 If they were, in any way, different from 
horses for the purpose of transatlantic shipping, much of the basis of the slave trade and the 
manner in which it was carried out would have been called into question. The effect of 
accepting – or even pronouncing on the validity of – the insurers’ arguments would have been 
to hold that the laws of England did not actually permit slaves to be treated as goods in being 
transported across the Atlantic.  
 The slave trade could not have survived such a ruling. From a mercantile point of view, 
the transatlantic slave trade depended on a complex network of supporting agreements, 
ranging from financing agreements to arranging for supplies to sustain the crew and the slaves 
being shipped. Although the profits from a successful voyage were very high, the risks 
inherent to the crossing of the Middle Passage by a slave ship were also high.146 An alteration 
to the manner in which the trade was carried out as fundamental as that which would result 
from a ruling that slaves could not be treated as chattel would destroy this balance. Yet on this 
trade depended the economy of much of the northwest of Britain. The consequences of a 
broader decision, in other words, could have been very severe for the British economy.  
 We know that Mansfield was aware of the potential consequences of decisions which 
touched upon the legal validity of slavery or its incidents. Persons known to have been close 
to him wrote exaggerated polemics about the disastrous consequences which any moves 
towards abolition or regulation of the slave trade would have. Economic losses, it was 
claimed, would run into the billions. Mansfield himself, in two cases relating to slavery, made 
it clear that he was concerned about the social and economic consequences of broad 
holdings.147 ‘The setting 14,000 or 15,000 men at once loose by a solemn opinion’, he 
declared in Somerset, ‘is very disagreeable in the effects it threatens.’148 He went on to 
quantify the monetary loss it might cause and the questions in relation to their wages, or 
‘actions for any slight coercion by the master.’ In Stapylton’s case,149 he worried about the 
consequences of a decision that slaves automatically became free on coming to England, and 
hoped that the question would never be decided: ‘for I would have all masters think them free, 
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and all Negroes think they were not, because then they would both behave better.’150 And, in 
R v Inhabitants of Thames Ditton,151 decided a few years after the Zong, he echoed the 
concerns he first raised in Somerset, saying that he had always denied suits by slaves seeking 
recovery of wages.  
 This fear, or wariness, of the consequences of tampering with the institution of slavery 
is likely to have been strengthened by a second, related, factor – Mansfield’s close 
identification with the mercantile interest, and the grand project that was the major focus of 
his judicial career: the construction of English commercial law.152 Mansfield’s chosen method 
for this was the incorporation of commercial custom into English law. And commercial 
custom recognised slavery, and the treatment of slaves as goods. Mansfield was aware of this, 
and it appears to have troubled him, but to totally deny recognition to something so 
unambiguously recognised in commercial practice, and which had the sanction of custom as 
immemorial usage, would have set a precedent that had the potential to damage the attempt to 
reshape the law in accordance with commercial custom. If commercial custom in relation to 
slaves was overruled on the basis that it contradicted the common law, then could the same 
not be done in relation to commercial custom on negotiable instruments? This was not an idle 
or hypothetical question, for Lord Holt was reputed to have done precisely that only a few 
decades earlier.153 Whilst a negative finding on the specific issue involved in this case (the 
status of slaves as cargo in insurance law) would not have caused any significant damage to 
the law merchant, the precedent it would have set – that commercial customs which conflicted 
with the common law would not be incorporated into English law – could potentially have 
been used to challenge the entire basis of Mansfield’s project.  
 Something of the difficulty faced by Mansfield in reconciling the conflict between his 
moral and commercial imperatives comes across in the transcripts of the cases he decided. In 
the Zong, he repeatedly points to the fact that, ‘though it shocks one very much’, merchants – 
the merchant jury in the first trial, and other merchants with whom he made enquiries – had 
told him that the situation with slaves was for the purpose of insurance practice treated as 
being the same as with horses.154 A similar point was made in The Wasp Trader,155 a later 
case also involving loss of slaves at sea, but in that case following a failed insurrection. In 
both cases, Mansfield went to great pains to frame the issues in terms of ordinary insurance 
law, for to do otherwise would have been to admit that the validity of the law merchant could 
be questioned on the basis of principles of common law. This would have called into question 
the project to which he had devoted so much of his judicial career, and it was not a step he 
was prepared to take.156  
 The recentness of the Bancoult decision makes it harder to accurately pinpoint the 
specific consequences that troubled the House of Lords, unlike the Zong where we have the 
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benefit of two centuries of historical hindsight.  A comparison with the Zong does, however, 
provide some hints as to what these factors might be.  
 As we have seen, the majority in the House of Lords in Bancoult - unlike the minority - 
refused to be drawn into the question of the limits of the executive’s authority to act by 
prerogative, going to the extent of denying that this was really at issue in the case, in much the 
same way that Mansfield declined to involve himself in the question of the limits of masters’ 
powers over their slaves.  As with the Zong, this was part of a broader trend also visible in 
other decisions of the House of Lords in cases involving a question as to the power of the 
executive – and, specifically, on restrictions based on rights or competence as distinct from 
other ordinary grounds of judicial review.   
 The past decades have seen, as political scientists have pointed out, the executive 
accumulate significant amounts of power at the expense of Parliament,157 which has once 
again brought to the fore the question of where the limits of executive power are appropriately 
drawn, and what types of checks are appropriate.  Against this background, it is arguable that, 
much as the questions posed by the rise of commerce was the focus of much of Mansfield’s 
judicial work, the House of Lords, too, has devoted a significant amount of attention to 
defining and restricting the scope and limits of judicial authority over the government and 
other public bodies.158  The jurisprudence of the House of Lords is not as consistent as that of 
Lord Mansfield: there are real differences between judges,159 reflecting no doubt the fact that 
no single judge has dominated the House as Mansfield dominated the Court of Kings Bench 
in his day.160 Some trends can, however, be broadly discerned, and these trends show very 
strong parallels to the approach of the majority to Bancoult.  
 On the one hand, recent years have seen the expansion of judicial review through the 
‘constitutionalisation’ of administrative law, 161 centred around the principle of legality.162  In 
England, this has also been accompanied by the rise, under the influence of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, of the standard of ‘proportionality’,163 which has had a 
significant impact on judicial review generally.164  These concepts are, as we have seen in 
section 3, predominantly ‘standards-based’ in the Posnerian sense discussed above.165 
 Yet these developments have been accompanied by an equally strong decline in the 
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willingness of the Law Lords to impose absolute limits, which are necessarily ‘rule-based’, 166 
on the powers of public bodies or bodies exercising statutory functions.  This is most striking 
in private law.  As Professor Steele has recently shown, only one single tort action against a 
public body was successful before the House of Lords in its final five years – and that related 
to a case where liability had already been admitted by the public body in question.167  Cases 
such as Marcic,168 Van Colle,169 and Watkins170 - the last of which expressly rejected an 
argument based on ‘constitutional’ rights – testify to a strong reluctance to recognise duties of 
care or other private law rights against public bodies.  Nor has this situation altered 
significantly since.171 
 In public law cases, too, there has been a general reluctance in cases involving 
constitutional rights to impose absolute limits on the powers of the executive by holding it to 
lack Parliamentary authority.  There was, in the wake of Simms,172 considerable expectation 
that the House of Lords would, like the High Court in Witham,173 systematically link the idea 
of common law constitutional rights with judicial review.174  And there are cases where the 
Simms principle has been forcefully applied.  A particularly strong recent example is the 
decision in Ahmed, 175 where the majority of the Supreme Court refused to construe a general 
provision in section 1 of the United Nations Act 1946 as authorising the making of asset-
freezing orders.176   But, as Professor Tomkins has recently argued,177 there is also a litany of 
cases where it has not been applied or where its meaning has been eroded – where, for 
example, the words of the statute in question have been declared to be unambiguous even in 
the absence of specific evidence that Parliament intended to authorise the imposition of 
restrictions upon rights.178  This latter class of case includes cases such as Gillan,179 Al Jedda, 
180 Austin,181 and RB (Algeria)182 in addition to Bancoult itself.   
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 The trend these cases reflect, at their core, is one where the House of Lords are 
disinclined to set absolute boundaries on the power of the executive, or to establish clear rules 
as to when executive action will require specific Parliamentary authorisation.  The preferred 
route in reviewing executive action is to review that specific instance of the exercise of a 
power using broad ‘standards’- based tests such as reasonableness or proportionality, rather 
than examining the question of the constitutional limits of the executive’s powers vis-a-vis 
Parliament – or, indeed, the principles underlying the constitutional understanding of their 
respective powers.  As Ahmed indicates, this is a trend rather than an absolute bar.  But that is 
exactly what we should expect of pragmatism which, as Posner argues, is always content to 
let islands of principled rules survive in a sea of pragmatic standards. 183  
 I do not propose to comment here on the desirability or otherwise of this general trend, 
or on the general appropriateness of pragmatism in constitutional cases – to do so would be 
beyond the scope of this article.  But it should be clear that the consequences in Bancoult, at 
least, were disastrous.  It is an unfortunate feature of pragmatism’s emphasis on outcomes as 
opposed to rights184 that when it comes to a case of a conflict between individual rights that 
have few direct ramifications beyond the immediate case on the one hand, and a broader 
outcome-oriented project that does on the other, it is the rights that have to give, no matter 
how much one has to stretch the law in the process.  That in doing so the majority conferred 
upon the executive a far broader prerogative and far greater independence from Parliament 
than has existed since the time of James I shows how far they were prepared to go, and how 
far removed their decision actually was from the formalist application of existing law their 
language suggests it to be.  
B ‘Though the heavens fall’: Pragmatic lawmaking and pragmatic justice 
Yet, whilst tolerance of human suffering is a possible incident of pragmatism, it is not a 
necessary one. There is one way in which the decision in the Zong differs significantly from 
Bancoult, and it does not favour Bancoult.  
 The decision in the Zong at first sight presents a puzzle that the decision in Bancoult 
does not. Why was Mansfield, who as we have seen could go to great lengths to achieve a 
‘just’ result, so committed to the commercial interest that he was willing to let it override the 
rights which were asserted in favour of slaves? Why, in other words, did he put his sentiment 
for commercial law ahead of his evident qualms about the excesses of the slave trade?  
 The answer to this question is complex, and is closely connected with the reasons 
behind Mansfield’s commitment to the cause of commercial law. Mansfield was a product of 
his times. Since the seventeenth century, lawyers and judges in England had closely identified 
themselves with the emerging commercial sector, and defended it against those who sought to 
encroach on commercial liberty – monarchs and Parliaments who sought to use commercial 
rights as tools of patronage; guilds who sought to preserve their control over entire sectors of 
commerce.185 The legal profession in early modern England stood against this, moved in part 
by the idea that law was an important tool in restraining the ‘over-mighty’.186  
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 In the eighteenth century, this notion was amplified by the idea that a new type of order 
was emerging – a commercial society, which had ‘rendered obsolete much that had been 
believed about society before’, and whose needs the law must adapt to meet.187 These ideas 
were intrinsically tied to the notions of civic humanism that started to entrench themselves in 
late seventeenth century Britain. Civic humanists were concerned with the question of how 
persons could be given the degree of autonomy necessary to participate fully in the polity as a 
citizen.188 The role of commerce caused significant divisions. On the one hand, the more 
‘republican’ thinkers who emphasised the need for civic virtue saw commerce as being a 
vehicle for the introduction of ‘corrupting’ luxury. At the other end of the spectrum were 
thinkers who emphasised the importance of liberty, and who saw commerce and the luxury 
that it produced in society as being a means through which self-interested action could 
promote the common good.189  
 A number of English and Scottish legal thinkers held views close to the latter position, 
and saw commerce – and commercial liberty – as being of central importance to broader civil 
and personal liberty190 and thus, ultimately, to replace the classical notion of civic virtue. Lord 
Kames – Mansfield’s closest Scottish counterpart – was much influenced by this idea: the 
manners and way of life of people and society, he argued, were changing, and the commercial 
society had rendered the historical law insufficient to contemporary purposes. If the moral 
imperatives of the law were to continue to have effect, the law must be transformed.191 
Research in recent decades has revealed the extent to which Adam Smith’s views on law and 
jurisprudence influenced his economic theories192 and, indeed, the extent to which he held 
moderate Whiggish views that would have been of the same philosophical roots as those 
which Mansfield was known to hold.193  
 The destruction of most of Lord Mansfield’s papers in the Gordon Riots makes it 
impossible to ascertain the precise extent to which he was influenced by these ideas, but there 
is much reason to believe that these ideas - of civic humanism, and the felt need to adapt the 
law so it met current needs rather than protecting the mighty of foregone eras - were amongst 
the motivations behind Lord Mansfield’s project to reshape English commercial law. We 
know that Smith and Kames were much attracted to Mansfield’s positions. Smith went as far 
as to send a presentation copy of the first edition of The Wealth of Nations to Lord 
Mansfield.194 Lord Kames for his part kept up a long-standing correspondence with Lord 
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Mansfield and even opened the second edition of his Principles of Equity with a letter to Lord 
Mansfield in which portrayed himself as pursuing the same programme as Lord Mansfield, 
and concluded by hoping that the book would gain Lord Mansfield’s approbation.195 It is 
entirely reasonable, therefore, to conclude that Lord Mansfield’s dedication to commercial 
law, like that of Adam Smith and Lord Kames, had a moral, rather than merely pragmatic 
base. The conflict between the commercial interest and the interests of the slaves was, in late 
eighteenth century terms, at heart a conflict between two notions of liberty, both grounded in 
humanism.  
 The result was that Mansfield was not merely aware of the moral implications of his 
holding in the Zong, but also appears to have tried to do something to mitigate the mischief 
which his holding could have caused. While the facts of the Zong were, as Mansfield 
repeatedly pointed out, ‘most uncommon’, they were not wholly unexpected. Webster has 
pointed to documents showing that at least some captains thought that tossing slaves 
overboard was a legitimate, and sensible, response to certain types of emergencies, because it 
would permit the organisers of the voyage to recover on their insurance policies, whereas 
permitting slaves to die natural deaths on board would not.196 The deep-running dispute about 
the facts, and the question of whether a state of necessity existed, strongly suggest a suspicion 
that this was what the crew of the Zong had done. This may have been a shocking case, and it 
may have been that – as Webster suggests – Collingwood was a particularly callous captain 
who did something few others would have done.197 But the decision in the Zong helped ensure 
that it stayed that way. By putting the shipowners to strict proof of the issue of necessity, it 
ensured that the sort of callous mass killing seen in the Zong would not happen again.  
 And, as it transpired, in the Zong itself, there was no second trial – the shipowners 
appear to have abandoned their action once it became clear that they would be put to strict 
proof of necessity and of causation. It is not too much of a stretch to suppose that this was 
precisely what Lord Mansfield intended, for this type of decision was typical of Lord 
Mansfield’s approach to doing justice. Twice in his judicial career, he invoked the lofty 
maxim, ‘fiat justitia ruat caelum’ – do justice though the heavens should fall. The first case 
arose out of the outlawry of John Wilkes, a populist dissident the targets of whose vicious 
attacks had included Mansfield himself. Wilkes challenged his outlawry and in his trial, as in 
the Zong, arguments relating to fundamental principles and freedoms were repeatedly raised. 
Mansfield, however, had no truck with those. After repeating this maxim, he proceeded to 
dismiss the outlawry not on the ground of the fundamental freedom of the individual to free 
speech or of the liberty of the press, but on the technicality that the indictment failed to name 
the county in which it was granted.198 The second time he cited the maxim was in Somerset, 
where he then proceeded to issue a very narrow holding which for all its rhetorical force only 
dealt with the specific power at issue in that case.  
 Mansfield attracted criticism both in his time and in ours for this seeming gap between 
his high rhetoric and the actuality of his actions.199 But this misses the point. To Mansfield, 
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doing justice meant not reshaping the law in a way that was ‘more just’ according to an 
external standard, but using the law pragmatically, to do what could be done on the facts of 
the case to achieve a result that was just in terms of its actual practical effects. In relation to 
Wilkes, it meant finding a technicality somewhere that could serve as a ground to release him 
– not a radical revision of the law on freedom of the press. In relation to Somerset, it meant 
delivering him from slavery even at the cost of departing from the conflicts rules which 
Mansfield ordinarily used which, as Watson shows, should have led to an orthodox 
application of Virginian law.200 But it did not mean radically altering the law to abolish 
slavery. In relation to the Catholics, it meant creating new evidentiary rules preventing their 
persecution by professional informers, not changing the constitutional position of the 
Anglican church. And in relation to the Zong, it meant doing what was necessary to ensure 
that it would remain forever a ‘most uncommon case’ and that the shipowners would not 
profit from the acts of their crew. It did not mean completely changing the nature of slave 
transport across the Atlantic. There was, in other words, a second aspect to Mansfield’s 
pragmatism - that even where broader considerations led him to choose a weaker, and morally 
less defensible, legal position, he tried to do what was pragmatically possible to mitigate the 
effects of his choice. In the Zong, no less than in relation to the persecution of Catholics, his 
actions were not ineffectual.  
 Mansfield’s pragmatism thus shared with modern pragmatism one of the characteristics 
identified by Atiyah – an overriding concern with outcomes.201 But the second of Atiyah’s 
characteristics – his apparent reluctance to consider the full implications of principles 
established by precedent – was not what it seemed. He was fully aware of the principle and of 
its importance; and, in a situation where two principles were in conflict, he attempted to strike 
a pragmatic balance that preserved some aspects of both.  
 It is this second aspect – the attempt to strike a pragmatic balance, and to deliver 
pragmatic justice – that is missing from the form of pragmatism we see exhibited by the 
House of Lords in Bancoult. The motivations that lie behind the move to limit state liability 
are a lot less clear than those that motivated Mansfield to build commercial law. As we have 
seen, they may reflect a response to what some have called the increasing 
‘constitutionalisation’ of administrative law.202 They may represent an attempt to protect 
government departments from having their work disrupted by the ever-present threat of 
litigation, a topic that has also attracted the attention of the Law Commission.203 They may, as 
has been suggested by some authors, including Lord Hoffmann (in his personal capacity), 
reflect a particular view of the separation of powers, where the courts, in the name of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, exercise restraint in reviewing executive action in areas that they 
deem more appropriate for legislative decision.204  
 The last of these is perhaps most consistent with the decision in Bancoult. Critical to it 
is a conflation of the legislature and executive, and the assumption that recognition of the 
supremacy of the legislature necessarily implies deference to the executive. The House of 
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Lords’ dismissal in Bancoult of the constitutionally important distinction between 
Parliament’s supremacy over colonial legislatures and its supremacy over the imperial 
executive, and their readiness to find the latter excluded from judicial review because the 
former was, are only too symptomatic of such a conflation of legislature and executive. They 
are also a stark illustration of the failure of pragmatic approaches to properly investigate the 
principles that lie behind the specific precedents and rules they claim to apply.205  
 The consequences of this are evident in the majority decision in Bancoult. Unlike the 
Zong, there was no attempt by the majority of the House of Lords in Bancoult, not even in 
part, to pragmatically redress the underlying issue of the possession of power by the mighty 
over a legally disenfranchised group. There is, consequently, nothing that mitigates the effect 
of their flagrant denial of a vulnerable group’s rights, or their refusal to deal with the 
fundamental questions of constitutional law it raised. As with the Zong, what we see in 
Bancoult is only presented as formalism. In reality, it is pragmatic lawmaking at its peak. But, 
unlike the Zong, it is untrammelled and unmitigated by any attempt to achieve pragmatic 
justice.206   
 The repeated expressions of sympathy by the majority in Bancoult suggest that they 
would not have been averse to finding a pragmatic balance.  But, as they ought to have 
realised, a pragmatic balance is harder to achieve in judicial review.  Judicial review lacks the 
wide range of personal and monetary remedies, and the many means of reducing, enhancing 
or denying these, that characterise private law, and that have made pragmatism such a 
powerful and successful tool in private law.207  These inherent limitations of pragmatism, of 
which judges of the highest court of the land should not have been unaware, make its 
deployment in Bancoult even more troubling , and even harder to justify.  For that reason, it 
stands as a stark example of the dangers of a pragmatic approach to constitutional questions. 
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